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CONGRESS AND THE 2000 FEDERAL CIVIL
RULES AMENDMENTS
Carl Tobias*

In April 2000, the United States Supreme Court promulgated,
and Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist transmitted to the United
States Congress, a comprehensive package of amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 The Judicial Conference of the
United States, the policymaking arm of the federal courts, had
forwarded these proposals to the Supreme Court in September
1999, and the Justices transmitted the amendments to Congress
without making any modifications. The new group of federal rules
amendments warrants assessment for two reasons. First, a few
provisions in the package of revisions are comparatively
controversial and could significantly change important aspects of
federal civil practice in the discovery process. Second, unless
Congress exercises its authority under the Rules Enabling Act of
1934 to alter the amendments, they will become effective in
December 2000. 2 These propositions mean that the procedural
modifications that the Supreme Court recently prescribed merit
evaluation. This Article undertakes that effort.
Part I traces the origins and development of the amendments.
Part II selectively analyzes the most disputed provisions in the
amendments and considers the impacts of the 2000 revisions.
Finding that certain amendments are rather controversial and may
have substantial effects either individually or synergetically, Part
III examines alternatives available to Congress and provides
recommendations for it.

• Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
I wish to thank Michael Higdon, Peggy Sanner, and Jeff Stempel for valuable suggestions,
Angela Dufva for processing this piece, and Jim Rogers for generous, continuing support.
Errors that remain are mine.
1 See Letter from William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Apr. 17, 2000), reprinted
in H.R. Doc. No.106-228, at 1-2 (2000).
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1994). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1925 (1982); Carl Tobias, lmproving the 1988
and 1990 Judicial lmprovements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1599-600 (1994).
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ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 2000 AMENDMENTS

The Supreme Court has promulgated three important
packages of amendments in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
over the last two decades. 3 Perhaps the most remarkable feature of
the 1980 set was the dissent by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who
admonished that "Congress' acceptance of these tinkering changes
will delay for years the adoption of genuinely effective reforms." 4
Notwithstanding this prediction, the Supreme Court prescribed a
second, significant group of amendments affecting the discovery
process in 1983. Those amendments imposed a proportionality
requirement and numerous, additional strictures on discovery,
while substantially increasing district judges' control over the
pretrial litigation process generally and discovery in particular.
These amendments also greatly enlarged judicial authority to levy
sanctions on parties and lawyers for violation of commands that
govern prefiling investigations under Federal Rule 11,5 pretrial
conferences under Federal Rule 16, and discovery under Federal
Rule 26. 6
The Supreme Court again reformed the discovery process in
1993. In that year, the Court promulgated a package of
amendments that imposed mandatory prediscovery, or automatic,
disclosure. This was the most contested proposal to change the
Federal Rules in fifty-five years. 7 Practically all elements of the
organized bar vociferously criticized the suggestions for automatic
disclosure. They argued that the concept recommended would
3 See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 507 U.S. 1091 (1993);
Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983); Order
Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997 (1980). For the pre-1980
history, see John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 505, 513-20 (2000); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691 (1998).
4 Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. at 1000 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV.
997, 998-1000 (1983); Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV.
747, 756-60 (1998); Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to
the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 456-59 (1991).
s The 1983 modification of Rule 11 proved to be the most controversial amendment
ever implemented and was further revised in 1993.
6 See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983).
See generally ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LA WYER
RESPONSIBILITY (1984); Subrin, supra note 3, at 744-45.
7 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(l).
See generally Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic
Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1992); Marcus,
supra note 4, at 764-68; Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the "Haves" a Little More:
Considering the 1998 Discovery Proposals, 52 SMU L. REV. 229, 233-36 (1999); Tobias,
supra note 2, at 1611-13.
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institute another, unwarranted layer of discovery; undermine the
traditional adversary system; create numerous, delicate ethical
problems; and leave uncertain exactly what material must be
divulged, thereby fostering unnecessary and expensive satellite
litigation over the provision's phraseology. 8 The 1993 automatic
disclosure amendment also authorized each of the ninety-four
federal district courts by local rule, judges by order in particular
cases, and parties by consent to opt out of the compulsory
automatic disclosure requirements. 9
In 1996, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules ("Advisory Committee")-the body with the primary
responsibility for studying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and developing constructive suggestions for improvementappointed a Discovery Subcommittee to explore the possibility of
additionally revising the provisos that govern discovery. 10 The
Advisory Committee appointed this Subcommittee even though
three factors militated against doing so: (1) the Supreme Court had
adopted three major sets of discovery amendments since 1980, one
of which had been adopted only three years earlier;11 (2) most
federal rule revisions require a generation of application and
evaluation before their effectiveness can be accurately
ascertained; 12 and (3) a growing number of federal courts observers
had called for less frequent federal rule amendment.13
The Discovery Subcommittee investigated the need to modify
s See, e.g., Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 507 U.S. 1091, 1099
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bell et al., supra note 7, at 28-32. For recent articulations,
see Thornburg, supra note 7, at 233-35 and D. Jeffrey Campbell & Christina H. Wang,
Proposed Amendments to Fed. Rule 26 Could Streamline Mandatory Initial Disclosure, 22
ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. 10 (2000).
9 See FED. R. Clv. P. 26(a)(l); infra note 25 and accompanying text. See generally
Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J.
929 (1996); Marcus, supra note 4, at 766-68; Lauren K. Robel, Mandatory Disclosure and
Local Abrogation: In Search of a Theory for Optional Rules, 14 REV. LITIG. 49 (1994);
Tobias, supra note 2, at 1612-15.
10 See Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules to Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 181
F.R.D. 24, 25 (1998) [hereinafter Niemeyer, Memorandum]; Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We
Go Again: Are the Federal Discovery Rules Really in Need of Amendment?, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 517, 521 (1998) [hereinafter Niemeyer, Here We Go Again].
11 See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
12 Two Advisory Committee Reporters so claimed. See Marvin E. Frankel, Some
Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 52-53 (1967) (citing
Professor Benjamin Kaplan's view); Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and
Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664,
677 (1979) (agreeing with Professor Kaplan's view).
13 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a
Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 854-55 (1993); John B. Oakley, An Open Letter on
Reforming the Process of Revising the Federal Rules, 55 MONT. L. REV. 435 (1994);
Thornburg, supra note 7, at 230-33.
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the provisions that govern discovery partly through authorizing
studies of discovery.
The Subcommittee commissioned
assessments by the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC"), the principal
research arm of the federal courts, and the RAND Corporation
Institute for Civil Justice, which had recently concluded a
comprehensive examination of expense and delay reduction
procedures applied in the federal district courts under the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990 ("CJRA"). 14 After evaluating the
results of these studies as well as considerable, additional relevant
information, the Discovery Subcommittee recommended that the
Advisory Committee propose certain amendments to the
In early 1998, the Advisory Committee
discovery rules. 15
assembled a package of proposed amendments in the discovery
provisions and forwarded those suggestions to the Judicial
Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
("Standing Committee"), which has the responsibility to review
recommendations for improvement developed by the Judicial
Conference advisory committees on appellate, bankruptcy, civil,
criminal, and evidentiary rules. 16 In the summer of 1998, the
Standing Committee concomitantly issued proposed amendments
and solicited public input on those amendments through written
submissions and three public hearings conducted in Baltimore,
Chicago, and San Francisco.17 During June 1999, the Standing
Committee considered the public comments, instituted a small
number of minor alterations, and submitted the package to the
Judicial Conference. 18 In September of that year, the Judicial
14 See James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil
Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613 (1998); Thomas E. Willging et
al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule
Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525 (1998).
is See Niemeyer, Memorandum, supra note 10, 181 F.R.D. at 24. See generally
Beckerman, supra note 3, at 506-09; Marcus, supra note 4, at 768-84; Thornburg, supra
note 7, at 246-49.
16 See Niemeyer, Memorandum, supra note 10, 181 F.R.D. at 24-27; Terry Carter, The
Latest Discovery Mission, AB.A. J., Sept. 1999, at 20. The Advisory Committee rejected
by a nine to four vote deletion of the provision that would narrow discovery's scope. See
Letter from Professor Thomas D. Rowe to Carl Tobias (Nov. 19, 1999); see also
Beckerman, supra note 3, at 542 n.154; infra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
17 See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 181 F.R.D.
18 (1998) [hereinafter Proposed Amendments]. I refer here to the proposed revisions
reprinted in the Federal Rules Decisions, because they are most accessible and because
the provisions I discuss were not changed. See generally Carl Tobias, Discovery Reform
Redux, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1433 (1999).
ts It rejected by a ten to two vote deletion of the provision that would have narrowed
the scope of discovery. See Letter from Richard H. Middleton, Jr., President, Association
of Trial Lawyers of America, to Honorable William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the
United States (Apr. 12, 2000); see also infra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
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Conference approved the proposed amendments except for one
requirement, 19 and tendered the recommended amendments to the
Supreme Court.20 In April 2000, after the Justices had analyzed
the package of amendments, the Court transmitted the set,
unchanged, to Congress.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE 2000 AMENDMENTS
The second section of this Article first descriptively and critically
assesses the specific 2000 amendments to the discovery requirements
recently promulgated by the Supreme Court. It then evaluates the
effects that the amendments could have separately and in
combination. This section emphasizes those amendments that
would institute the greatest changes in the current discovery system
or that have been most controversial, although additional
alterations may prove to be similarly controversial once federal
judges have implemented and interpreted the rules.
A.

Specific Amendments

Automatic Disclosure
The 2000 amendment to Federal Rule 26(a)(l) would
significantly change the 1993 requirement that a litigant disclose
information that is "relevant to disputed facts alleged with
particularity in the pleadings. "21 The 2000 amendment would
mandate that a party divulge only material that "support[s] its
claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment."22 The 2000
amendment, therefore, would narrow considerably the 1993
provision because the modified concept demands that litigants
exchange less information. 23 Moreover, the 2000 amendment will
1.

19 See Proposed Amendments, supra note 17, 181 F.R.D. at 87-89 (proposed
amendment in Rule 34(b)). See generally Thornburg, supra note 7, at 239-40; Tobias,
supra note 17, at 1441. The one requirement that the Conference rejected was the "costbearing requirement," which would have authorized judges to permit discovery that was
disproportionate to the needs of a case only if the party seeking broader discovery paid for
it.
20 It also rejected by a thirteen to twelve vote deletion of the provision that would have
narrowed the scope of discovery. See Letter from Thomas D. Rowe to Carl Tobias, supra
note 16; see also infra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
21 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a); see also Proposed Amendments, supra note 17, 181 F.R.D. at
57-58 (amendment in Rule 26(a)(l)). See generally Rogelio A. Lasso, Gladiators Be Gone:
The New Disclosure Rules Compel a Reexamination of the Adversary Process, 36 B.C. L.
REV. 479 (1995); Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(a)-"Much Ado About Nothing?", 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679 (1995); Thornburg,
supra note 7, at 236-37.
22 See Proposed Amendments, supra note 17, at 57-58 (amendment in Rule 26(a)(l)).
23 The new provision should decrease incentives to plead with specificity and, thus,
honor the Federal Rules' notice pleading regime. See generally Beckerman, supra note 3,
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apply nationwide in every federal district court. 24 This contrasts with
the 1993 version, which empowered all ninety-four districts to "optout" by prescribing local variations on the federal strictures or by
completely rejecting those requirements; a substantial number of
courts exercised that authority primarily to eschew the commands
in the federal proviso.25
The rule revision entities, and in particular the Advisory
Committee, seemingly premised their determination to alter
automatic disclosure in substantial measure on two important
perceptions. The first was the controversial character of the
disclosure mandates imposed by the 1993 revision. 26 Second, the
opt-out mechanism had further balkanized the already fractured
state of federal civil practice and procedure by encouraging the
district courts to implement local disclosure procedures that
departed from the federal disclosure requirements, or to reject these
requirements entirely. 27
Those perceptions may have been inaccurate, however. First,
the 1993 disclosure amendment has apparently been somewhat less
controversial as a practical matter than numerous critics had
predicted. For example, the FJC assessment found many more
lawyers (1) "reported that initial disclosure decreased litigation
expense, time from filing to disposition, the amount of discovery,
and the number of discovery disputes than said it increased them"
and (2) stated that "disclosure increased overall procedural
fairness, the fairness of the case outcome, and the prospects of
settlement than said it decreased them.m8 Second, the opt-out
device may have fragmented federal civil procedure less
substantially than some observers claimed. For instance, only
sixteen percent of counsel whom the FJC surveyed believed that
the application of inconsistent disclosure measures and discovery
at 534-43; Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986). However, the revision that narrows the
scope of discovery may increase the incentives to plead with particularity. See infra notes
40-41 and accompanying text.
24 See Proposed Amendments, supra note 17, at 57 (amendment in Rule 26(a)(l)).
25 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(l); see also Donna Stienstra, Implementation of Disclosure
in United States District Courts with Specific Attention to Courts' Responses to Selected
Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 182 F.R.D. 304 (1998); supra note 9
and accompanying text.
26 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
27 See Niemeyer, Here We Go Again, supra note 10, at 519; Campbell & Wang, supra
note 8; Willging et al., supra note 14, at 541; see also supra notes 9, 25 and accompanying
text.
28 Willging et al., supra note 14, at 535. The FJC reported little evidence of satellite
litigation that involved disclosure. See id. The RAND study agreed with this idea and
found that disclosure only minimally affected cost and delay. See Kakalik et al., supra
note 14, at 658, 678.
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provisions across federal districts produced serious problems, and
a mere six percent considered intradistrict conflicts to create such
complications, notwithstanding the FJC's assertion that growing
numbers of judges and attorneys have claimed that disuniformity
in the disclosure and discovery strictures poses serious difficulties
warranting resolution. 29
It is unclear why the Advisory Committee decided to
recommend the change in automatic disclosure at this time. The
FJC and RAND evaluations suggest that the 1993 disclosure
amendment has functioned rather effectively. Insofar as the
amendment has seemingly operated less well, these perceptions may
have been attributable to the comparatively limited implementation
and assessment that the revision has received or to the controversy
surrounding the initial consideration and promulgation of the 1993
disclosure amendment.
Even if the present need for modification were more
compelling, it remains uncertain that the changes instituted by the
2000 amendment will constitute significant improvement. The
amendment replaces phraseology that has relatively definite
meaning, and to which judges, counsel, and parties are accustomed,
with wording that may be somewhat ambiguous. The new
terminology might correspondingly lead to considerable ancillary
litigation that involves its interpretation and the scope of
disclosure mandated, thus causing expense and delay. 30 Moreover,
the requirement that parties divulge less material will arguably
complicate plaintiffs' efforts to secure the information they need
for proving and settling their cases. 31 Furthermore, the 2000
amendment alters the disclosure requirements applicable in every
lawsuit, even though the FJC and RAND evaluations concluded
that the 1993 measure was problematic in a comparatively small
number of cases, especially in complex litigation. 32
In the final analysis, the rule revisors, and, most importantly,
29 See Willging et al., supra note 14, at 541-42, 583-84. Sixty percent of the lawyers
polled think that interdistrict inconsistency creates problems. See id. at 583; see also supra
note 27 and accompanying text. Fewer than half of the districts applied the federal
disclosure strictures. See Stienstra, supra note 25.
30 See Pearl Zuchlewski, Proposed Amendments May Transform Civil Discovery Rules,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 10, 1999, at 1. See generally Beckerman, supra note 3, at 540-41.
31 See Thornburg, supra note 7, at 249-54; Zuchlewski, supra note 30. Disclosure also
applies nationally, thus forfeiting flexibility to tailor the measure to local conditions and to
experiment, testing which might lead to the development of a better disclosure procedure.
See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text; see also Tobias, supra note 2, at 1615-16;
Carter, supra note 16.
32 See Kakalik et al., supra note 14, at 682; Willging et al., supra note 14, at 538, 551.
See generally Beckerman, supra note 3, at 506-09; Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth
of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 685-86 (1998); Thornburg,
supra note 7, at 246-49.
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the Advisory Committee, appeared to express substantial
ambivalence regarding the disclosure concept. 33 The Advisory
Committee seemed to acknowledge that judges and attorneys have
not enthusiastically endorsed the 1993 amendment and that the
disclosure provision has minimally affected discovery, but the
Advisory Committee evinced reluctance to abandon the mechanism
altogether and attempted to maintain a vestige of the notion. 34 The
Advisory Committee's perspective may reflect the ambivalence
evidenced by numerous members of the bench and bar. 35
2. Scope of Discovery
In addition to the changes in disclosure requirements, the
2000 amendments will circumscribe the scope of discovery that has
traditionally been available. For decades, parties have been able
to discover information that is "relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action." 36 The new version would restrict
the scope of discovery to material "that is relevant to the claim or
defense," while litigants would be able to secure information that is
relevant to the subject matter only after parties file motions that
show that they have good cause to request broader discovery. 37 The
apparent objectives of the federal rule revision entities in developing
the amendment are to limit discovery and "fishing expeditions" by
restricting parties to discovery of material that implicates matters
raised in the pleadings. 38
Several features of the change in the scope of available discovery
resemble features of the change in disclosure. First, it is unclear
why the rule revision entities prescribed this alteration now. For
example, the FJC and RAND assessments indicate that discovery
33 See Edward D. Cavanagh, Obstacles in the Search for Truth: Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Hinder Discovery in Ways Unnecessary and Unjust, LEGAL
TIMES, July 27, 1998, at 21.
34 See id.; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Advisory

Committee chair frankly conceded:
[T]he beginning was a strong disclosure rule that could be, and was, defeated by
local option. The next step is a diluted disclosure rule that cannot be defeated by
local option. Perhaps in several more years the time will come for a strong
disclosure rule that cannot be defeated by local option.
Niemeyer, Memorandum, supra note 10, 181 F.R.D. at 30.
35 See Willging et al., supra note 14, at 543, 592; Carter, supra note 16.
36 FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b){l). Information is discoverable, if it "appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence," even if it is not admissible at
trial. Id. See generally Beckerman, supra note 3, at 513-17; Marcus, supra note 4, at 764-68;
Subrin, supra note 3, at 734-45.
37 Proposed Amendments, supra note 17, at 64 (amendment in Rule 26{b){l)).
See
generally Thornburg, supra note 7, at 237-39; Gregory P. Joseph, Civil Rules II, NAT'L L.J., Apr.
24, 2000, at Al 7.
38 See Niemeyer, Memorandum, supra note 10, at 27, 32-33; Cavanagh, supra note 33.
See generally Beckerman, supra note 3, at 540-42; Subrin, supra note 3, at 734-39.
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operates effectively in a majority of cases and that the 1993
changes have worked reasonably well. 39 Insofar as too-expansive
discovery poses difficulties, judges presently have numerous means
for narrowing the breadth of discovery.
If modification in discovery were clearly needed now, the
revision promulgated may not represent a significant advance and
may in fact serve only to confuse and complicate the discovery
process. The revision substitutes a new standard, the "relevant to the
claim or defense" standard, for the long-standing "subject matter"
concept.
Although the "subject matter" concept has
comparatively clear meaning and is a criterion with which judges,
lawyers, and parties are familiar, the "relevant to the claim or
defense" concept could well foster satellite litigation over its
construction and over discovery's scope. Moreover, the amendment
might undermine the traditional notice pleading regime that the
initial Advisory Committee incorporated in the original Federal
Rules in 1938 and that federal judges have steadfastly maintained
over the subsequent six decades.4° For example, the "claim or
defense" phraseology may require plaintiffs to draft relatively
particularized pleadings before they have access to information under
the control of defendants that would currently be available through
discovery. 41 The new terminology might concomitantly encourage
plaintiffs to draft broader pleadings than the material they possess
can substantiate in order to secure increased discovery and, thus,
make them vulnerable to Rule 12(b) motions to dismiss and to Rule
11 sanctions.
Narrowing discovery could also complicate the attempts of
plaintiffs to prove and settle their lawsuits. The provision for
plaintiffs to seek broader discovery on motions for good cause
shown and for judges to exercise their discretion in granting the
requests might ameliorate these circumstances somewhat. However,
several pragmatic realities of modem civil litigation could make the
39 See Kakalik et al., supra note 14, at 682; Willging et al., supra note 14, at 534-35. But
see Beckerman, supra note 3, at 508-09. The changes seem to have limited some
contentiousness that involved discovery without preventing parties from securing necessary
discovery. See Tobias, supra note 17, at 1440.
40 See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). See generally Beckerman, supra note 3, at 534-43; Marcus,
supra note 23; Carl Tobias, Elevated Pleading in Environmental Litigation, 27 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 357 (1994); Joseph, supra note 37; Letter from Richard H. Middleton, Jr. to
Honorable William H. Rehnquist, supra note 18, at 2.
41 See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Summary of Public
Comments (1999); Joseph, supra note 37; Zuchlewski, supra note 30. These effects
warrant comparison with those that the disclosure revision may have. See supra note 23
and accompanying text.
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proviso insufficient. Those phenomena include the expense that
plaintiffs must absorb when pursuing greater discovery, pressures
imposed on federal district courts by docket growth and the
increasing need for judicial case management, and many judges'
reluctance to expend scarce resources on the resolution of
discovery disputes. 42 This situation, together with the reduced
information that parties must exchange through automatic
disclosure,43 may upset the comparative equilibrium that has
previously obtained between the interests of plaintiffs and
defendants. 44 Finally, the new rule may prove too much. Although
the FJC and RAND evaluations suggest that overly broad discovery
creates difficulties only in a rather small number of relatively
complex lawsuits, the new rule will affect every civil case brought
in the federal courts. 45
B. General Ideas
This examination reveals several similarities between those
components of the federal rule revision package that are most
controversial and that would effect the greatest change. First, the
current need for alteration, particularly given the findings in the FJC
and RAND studies that automatic disclosure and discovery now
function rather effectively, remains uncertain. Second, insofar as
disclosure or discovery produces complications which warrant
remediation, the problems seem to arise in comparatively few cases,
and judges have numerous measures available to them that can
effectively address the difficulties. These propositions suggest the
inadvisability of applying the new requirements to all lawsuits.
Third, if changes are in fact necessary, the suggested amendments
may not realize improvements.
Illustrative is the lingering
uncertainty about whether the new provisions would upset the
delicate balance that presently prevails between plaintiffs and
42 See Beckerman, supra note 3, at 564-69; Joseph, supra note 37; Thornburg, supra
note 7, at 251-53.
43 See supra notes 22-23, 31 and accompanying text.
44 See Beckerman, supra note 3, at 540-41, 561-69; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the
Generic Whipping Post. The Continuing Odyssey of Discovery "Reform," 63 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. (forthcoming 2000); Thornburg, supra note 7, at 231; Zuchlewski, supra note 3; Letter
from Richard H. Middleton, Jr., to Honorable William H. Rehnquist, supra note 18. But
see Niemeyer, Memorandum, supra note 10, at 27; Carter, supra note 16.
45 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Similar ideas apply to the revision that
imposes presumptive limitations on depositions of one day or seven hours. See Proposed
Amendments, supra note 17, at 83 (amendment in Rule 30(d)(2)). For instance, it is
unclear that this revision is needed. To the extent that deposition length is problematic,
judges can use Rule 30 or match temporal limitations with particular cases' needs in pretrial
conferences. The change also applies to all lawsuits when restrictions may be warranted in
few. See Tobias, supra note 17, at 1440 n.42.; Cavanagh, supra note 33.
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defendants by favoring defense interests too .-much.46 More
specifically, plaintiffs will either have access to less information or
incur expense in securing that material to which they are now
entitled. Both the disclosure and discovery changes would also
replace strictures that have relatively definite meaning, and to which
judges, attorneys, and litigants are accustomed with new terminology
that may prove ambiguous, will require a decade of implementation
and interpretation, and could foster costly ancillary litigation over the
language employed.
In short, the disadvantages that important, specific components
of the 2000 federal rules amendments would impose both alone
and synergistically may outweigh the benefits. Nevertheless, the
foregoing conclusions remain controversial and somewhat unclear,
while the proposed amendments were developed by expert rule
revision entities after they had commissioned assessments and
undertaken considerable study, and solicited and examined
substantial public input. Congress, therefore, should seriously
consider scrutinizing the package of amendments to ascertain
whether any of its constituents or the group warrants alteration.
Ill.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FuTURE

An Introductory Word
Senators and representatives have several options available to
them under the court rule-making regime that the Rules Enabling
Act of 1934 prescribes. Legislators can simply institute no action and
allow the revisions that the Supreme Court promulgated to become
effective in December 2000. 47 Congress could also reject or change
individual amendments or the entire set. Lawmakers might
correspondingly introduce bills that would modify the revisions
and use the legislation proposed as a vehicle for evaluating particular
amendments or the whole package.
The last course of action appears preferable for two reasons.
First, the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, especially as modernized by
the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988
("JIA"), appears to contemplate an arguably increased measure of
congressional involvement in the rule revision process.48 Second,
A.

See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
48 The JIA accorded Congress several additional months to review amendments that
the Supreme Court promulgates, and lawmakers apparently intended that this change
facilitate review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a)(1994); see also H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 27-28
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5986-88. See generally Linda S. Mullenix,
Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69
N.C. L. REV. 795 (1991); Tobias, supra note 2, at 1600 n.61.
46
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the earlier analysis suggests that there are legitimate concerns about
the need for specific components of this group of amendments and
perhaps for the entire set. These concerns have salience today, so
soon after the major 1993 alterations, when those changes have been
rather efficacious, and problems have seemingly arisen in rather
few cases, while judges have apparently been able to address many of
them effectively. 49 Too-frequent rule amendment can also deprive
attorneys, parties, and judges of familiar concepts, language, and
interpretations, replacing them with different ideas and phraseology,
which lawyers and litigants must learn about, comprehend, and
satisfy, and judges have to master, enforce, and construe.50 The
institution of a new discovery regime, accordingly, will require a
"shakedown" period as the revised strictures are implemented,
often through time-consuming, unnecessary satellite litigation over
the terminology of the nascent rules. 51 Even if modification is
warranted now, it is not clear that the amendments promulgated
will yield significant improvement for the numerous reasons
canvassed above. Furthermore, such congressional action would not
be unprecedented. Lawmakers have increasingly participated in
rule amendment over the last quarter century, albeit to mixed
reviews. 52
Senators and representatives should evaluate a number of
countervailing considerations. Perhaps most important are certain
systemic matters. The 2000 revisions constitute the second
significant test of the rule amendment procedures imposed by the
JIA, and the federal rule revisors seem to have followed closely the
process prescribed.53 For example, the Advisory Committee
appointed a Discovery Subcommittee to explore the need for
modification, and this entity commissioned several informative

49

See supra notes 28, 32, 39, 45 and accompanying text.

so See Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil
Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1422-25 (1992). See generally Gregory C. Sisk, The
Balkanization of Appellate Justice: The Proliferation of Local Rules in the Federal Circuits,
68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 30-33 (1997).
51 Cf Arthur R. Miller, The New Certification Standard Under Rule 11, 130 F.R.D. 479,
505-06 (1990). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1930-34 (1989); supra note
12 and accompanying text.
52 See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 902-07 (1999); Charles Gardner
Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary's Imperiled Role in
Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1187-91 (1996); Oakley, supra note 13, at 436-37;
Tobias, supra note 2, at 1598; Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil
Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 460-62 (1993).
53 The first test led to the 1993 revisions. See Mullenix, supra note 48; Tobias, supra
note 2; see also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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studies.54 The Subcommittee relied on the empirical data adduced
in the analyses conducted to recommend changes that the Advisory
Moreover, the Standing Committee
Committee adopted.55
solicited and assessed much public input, and the Judicial
Conference did jettison one of the most controversial provisions
suggested.56 In short, there are convincing reasons why lawmakers
might exercise deference to the expert Judicial Conference
committees, which have carefully studied modern discovery,
crafted proposed alterations, and evaluated considerable public
input on those recommendations. These entities, comprised of
committee members who are principally judges with substantial
responsibility for day-to-day dispute resolution and experienced
advisors on whom they rely, may well have better institutional
memory, broader expertise, greater appreciation of the relevant
issues, and more resources to commit to the rule amendment
endeavor than Congress has.
In the final analysis, senators and representatives confront a
close question about whether they should intervene in the rule
revision process that produced the 2000 amendments or even
scrutinize those changes. Persuasive arguments favor deferring to
the rule revisors. However, equally strong arguments suggest the
advisability of at least assessing certain, individual amendments in
the package and the rule revision process. In particular, the
enhanced congressional role envisioned by the IlA and the actual
need for a set of amendments at this time as a general matter, and for
narrowing the scope of disclosure and discovery specifically,
warrant evaluation.
B. Specific Suggestions
Members of Congress should introduce proposed legislation
that could serve as a mechanism for considering the group of
revisions recently adopted by the Supreme Court. The Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on Administration of the Courts or the
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and the
Courts may want to schedule public hearings to examine, and solicit

See supra notes 10, 14-15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. Numerous observers have decried the
lack of empirical support for rule revision. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in
Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for
Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994); Walker, supra note 52, at 455-59.
56 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. The JIA required that the rule
revisors encourage and consider greater public input in the revision process. See Mullenix,
supra note 48, at 799-800; Tobias, supra note 2, at 1599-600; Walker, supra note 52, at 46869.
54
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public input on, the package of amendments promulgated.57
Lawmakers might initially analyze several general or systemic
issues. First, senators and representatives could explore whether the
increased frequency of federal rule revision, especially with respect to
discovery, has exacerbated certain above-mentioned disadvantages,
such as the cost of ancillary litigation over rapidly changing
procedures, and, if so, whether these detrimental consequences
outweigh the benefits. 58 Should Congress reach an affirmative
conclusion, it might admonish the rule amendment entities to
revise the provisions less frequently, impose a prescribed period
for modifications, or even declare a moratorium on rule
amendment. 59
A second, related question is whether alteration of the
discovery regime is necessary. Legislators could probe the issue in
light of the FJC and RAND determinations that disclosure and
discovery are generally working well and having the effects that
the rule revisors intended, that many cases involve no discovery, and
that discovery is problematic only in a small percentage of lawsuits,
and that judges have numerous means for addressing those
difficulties that do materialize. 6° Congress should concomitantly
explore whether amendment is warranted at this juncture, so soon
after the important 1993 revisions, given the complications
entailed in too-frequent amendment. 61 These ideas suggest that
change in the discovery system may not be needed now. 62
Even if lawmakers conclude that modification in discovery is
currently required, they should closely evaluate whether the
revisions that the Supreme Court has promulgated will be an
improvement over the present system by examining the projected
disadvantages and benefits. One disadvantage is that the 2000
package, especially the provisions that narrow the scope of
automatic disclosure and discovery, appear overly favorable to
defendants. 63 Other disadvantages include the loss of concepts and
terminology to which judges, attorneys, and litigants are
accustomed; the expense for parties and counsel of comprehending
and conforming to the altered strictures; and the cost of satellite
s1 These are the subcommittees that have jurisdiction over the federal courts generally
and rule revision specifically.
ss See supra notes 49-50, 52 and accompanying text.
59 See sources cited supra note 13.
60 See supra notes 28, 32, 39, 45 and accompanying text.
61 See supra notes 49-50, 52 and accompanying text.
62 See Mullenix, supra note 32, at 689; Stempel, supra note 44; Thornburg, supra note 7,
at 262-65.
63 See supra notes 43-44, 46 and accompanying text. Central to this imbalance is the
apparently misplaced reliance on judges to manage discovery and broaden its scope when
needed.
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litigation over the interpretation of different phraseology. 64 The
benefits ostensibly encompass improved discovery measured in terms
of economic and temporal savings as well as reduced discovery
abuse. 65 The disadvantages, and even more the benefits, may resist
very accurate measurement, until judges have applied the new
procedures and lawyers and parties have attempted to satisfy them.
The examination above indicates that the proposed
amendments will not be an improvement, either because the
detriments would seemingly outweigh the putative advantages or
because the question is sufficiently close to warrant consideration
of alternatives. For example, a felicitous approach might be to limit
alterations of the present discovery scheme to those relatively few
cases in which discovery is most problematic. More specifically,
this change could be modeled on the differential procedural
treatment prescribed by the Manual for Complex Litigation. 66
A third, general question is the propriety of the Advisory
Committee's decision to replace virtually all of the discovery
provisions for local option with federal requirements that apply in all
ninety-four federal district courts.67 Attorneys and legal scholars
have criticized these local options because they undercut uniform
national procedure and complicate efforts to practice in multiple
districts, which may impose diverse strictures.68 However, some
courts apparently honor the idea of national consistency in the
breach, and local option provisos do afford districts the requisite
flexibility for experimenting and for employing local measures that
treat unusual local conditions.69 In the end, national uniformity
should override the need to test and to match procedures with
peculiar local situations because, for instance, there are other ways
of facilitating experimentation.70
64 See supra note notes 30, 50 and accompanying text.
65 This assumes that the notion of discovery abuse, over which there has been a longstanding, controversial debate, can be satisfactorily defined, identified, and treated. See,
e.g., Mullenix, supra note 32, at 684; Jack B. Weinstein, What Discovery Abuse? A
Comment on John Setear's The Barrister and the Bomb, 69 B.U. L. REV. 649 (1989). See
generally Beckerman, supra note 3.
66 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) §§ 21.4-21.494 (1995). See
generally A. Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques of Case Management: The Challenge of the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 877, 898-99 (1993); Stephen N.
Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective
Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27 (1994); Cavanagh, supra note 33.
67 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
68 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 9; supra note 29 and accompanying text.
69 See Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with
Uniformity, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 853 (1989). See generally Levin, supra note 66, at 888-94;
Carl Tobias, Some Realism About Federal Procedural Reform, 49 FLA. L. REV. 49, 67-68,
71-73 (1997).
70 For example, Congress should revive and prescribe a 1991 proposed amendment to
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Lawmakers might also explore several specific questions that
have been mentioned earlier. Perhaps most important, Congress
should evaluate whether the 2000 amendments would narrow the
scope of discovery too substantially and, if so, whether the
provision for parties to seek expanded discovery on good cause
shown and for judges to permit broader discovery suffices.
Legislators might similarly examine whether the amendment would
unduly circumscribe automatic disclosure.
Senators and
representatives should correspondingly assess whether the new
wording that implements these two alterations is clear and whether
the terminology will foster ancillary litigation.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court recently transmitted to Congress a
thorough package of amendments in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that govern discovery. The need for the most significant
and controversial changes in the set and for the package as a whole
remains uncertain. Therefore, lawmakers ought to scrutinize the
revisions to ascertain whether they should take effect in December
2000.

Rule 83, which the rule revisors withdrew in deference to the Civil Justice Reform Act
experimentation, and which could facilitate testing. See Levin, supra note 66, at 891-92;
Tobias, supra note 2, at 1616. See generally A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A
Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1991); Laurens Walker,
Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field Experiments, 51 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROSS. 67 (1988).

